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The European Parliament has introduced a regulation in 2002 requiring all public traded 
firms in the European Union (EU) to prepare their consolidated financial statements 
according to the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since 2005, more than 150 countries have adopted the IFRS. 
This is considered to be an outstanding improvement to accounting regulation that became a 
global concern of accounting scandals and bankruptcy during the recent financial crisis. 
Eventually, as firms are harmonizing their accounting and reporting standards, a question 
arises whether IFRS has an impact of this change on earnings manipulation and transparency 
of firms accounting reporting procedure. This chapter documents the impact of IFRS on 
earnings manipulation behaviour considering the impact of the financial crisis on the 
European banking system after 2008. An analysis of 1,688 listed firms from EU countries 
from 2000 to 2015 shows that although earnings management can be a possibility during 
financial crisis and IFRS can change managers’ accrual earnings behaviour, but managers 
may still use real earnings manipulation to meet or beat their earnings target. The findings 
also indicate that strict accounting standards are not enough to mitigate earnings 
management, especially for financially distressed firms. We contribute to recent literature on 
earnings management to assist policy makers to take decision based on the earnings 








We aim to examine the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on two 
measures of earnings management, namely performance-adjusted accrual and real earnings 
management of financially distressed firms in the European Union (EU) countries. We reason 
that distressed firms have strong incentives to manipulate their earnings during financial 
crisis and adoption of IFRS can mitigate such behaviour during recent financial crisis. Prior 
studies show that firms try to avoid bankruptcy by managing their earnings upward and 
eliminate the associated costs (HassabElnaby et al. 2007; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz et 
al. 2014). In other words, if a firm is in financially distressed conditions, its managers can 
expect to have their compensation reduced and suffer loss of reputation (Gilson 1989) or 
eventually can lose their job. Thus, managers can save their benefits by achieving a reference 
point (meet or beat the earnings) and representing their firms as consistently growing firms. 
Previous literature indicates that managers prefer to show a stable performance by earnings 
management (Gunny, 2010; Braam et al., 2015). Although this procedure is costly because if 
detected, the firms may end up in a financial scandal, for certain types of earnings 
management it is not easily detectable by independent auditors (Graham et al, 2005).  
 
Therefore, prior studies either indicate that managers use only accrual earnings 
management or both accrual and real earnings management to avoid financial distress. 
However, the existing studies fail to consider the mandatory adoption of IFRS and financial 
crisis. We, in this chapter, aim to analyse the impact of the adoption of IFRS on earnings 
management of the financially distressed (listed) firms in the EU countries. In addition, we 
examine the earnings management behaviour of financially distressed firms during financial 
crisis. For this purpose, two earnings management strategies are considered, namely real and 
accrual-based earnings management. Extant studies show that managers use these two types 
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of earnings management strategies, and substitute with each other when needed, in 
manipulating the reported earnings (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; 
Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). The results from our study fill the gap in the existing 
literature on testing the change in managers’ behaviour and the usage of earnings 
management techniques before and after the harmonization of international reporting 
standards and during financial crisis. 
We use a data set of 1,688 listed firms from 26 EU countries during 2000- 2015. The 
results show that the financial crisis (that started in 2008 in the USA and the European debt 
crisis of 2009-2010) has motivated managers to manipulate their firms’ earnings. However, 
as the IFRS adoption increases transparency in accounting system, firms choose more real 
earnings management, which is not easily detectable than accrual-based activities.  
As accounting information is scrutinised in details, especially by auditors, it has been 
difficult for the financially distressed firms to wait until the end of financial year to do 
accrual earnings management. However, the financially distressed firms prefer to do more 
real earnings management when they are under extra pressure from the watchdogs after IFRS 
adoption and during financial crisis. We believe that to protect their reputation and not to 
show further distress the managers of financially distressed firms depend more on real 
earnings management.  
  This study contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it adds to the literature 
by showing different types of earnings management strategies before and after the 
harmonization of accounting standards. Secondly, it investigates a cross-country dataset to 
conclude the effect of financial crisis and IFRS adoption together on the firms’ earnings 
management behaviour. Finally, and most importantly, we use a probability of bankruptcy 
measure, which helps us to identify firms expected earnings manipulation behaviour in 
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anticipation of financial shock. These findings add to the body of literature examining 
alternative tools to manage earnings (e.g. Zang, 2012) 
 
  The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 includes literature 
review, Sections 3 and 4 present methodology and results. The final section concludes our 
study and includes directions for future research.  
 
2. Literature review 
Since 2005, more than 150 countries have adopted the IFRS. The regulation was introduced 
on 19 July 2002 by the European Parliament (1606/2002/EC), requiring all publicly traded 
firms in the EU to prepare their consolidated financial statements according to the 
International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IAS/IFRS) from 2005. The accounting specialists broadly recognize the importance of 
moving through a set of global and harmonized accounting standards. However, IFRS 
adoption and its economic impact involve remarkable concerns (see Daske et al., 2008; 
Bhimani, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010; Aharony et al., 2010). The main purpose of IFRS is 
to improve transparency in reporting of financial statement and to decrease asymmetric 
information and associated information costs (Ashbaugh et al. 2001, Ewert et al., 2005; 
Humphrey et al., 2009; Shima et al., 2011). The existing accounting regulations expect 
managers to present true and fair view of their firms, but managers manipulate earnings by 
applying accrual and real earnings management strategies (Badertscher, 2011; Braam et al., 
2015).  Accrual-based earnings management changes the accounting estimates and methods 
that a firm uses under the accepted accounting rules (Dechow et al., 2000) and real earnings 
management is a tool that permits companies to change the construction and the time of real 
transactions in order to meet short-term profit goals (Roychowdhury, 2006). Accrual-based 
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earnings management can be used only at the end of financial year and is less costly but 
being easily recognized than real earnings management (Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). Firms use accrual and real strategies as substitutes or complement in controlling 
firm’s earnings (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 
2012). Earnings management acts as an intermediary for agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders as it reduces the quality of accounting information (Asem et al., 2015).   
 
The existing literature remains inconclusive about the impact of IFRS on earnings 
management and quality of accounting reporting in Europe. Firms following international 
standards show an improvement in quality of reporting, less earnings management, timely 
loss recognition, and value relevance (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). 
However, many studies conclude that firms which are obliged to adopt IFRS do not 
demonstrate signs of improvement in accounting quality or less earnings management 
(Christensen et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Acceptance of international standards 
increases the market liquidity and the equity valuations, but it decreases the firms' cost of 
capital (Daske et al., 2008; Laux and Leuz, 2009). After the harmonization of accounting and 
reporting standards, an increase in the relevance of accounting figures’ value is noticed and it 
does not affect the book value of the equity (Alali and Foote, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013.). In 
addition, after acceptance of international accounting standards, earnings management is 
affected negatively (Antonio Marra et al., 2011).  
Quality in financial reporting still remains a major concern. The international 
principles-based accounting standards at the same time provide opportunities for judgment, 
permitting earnings management techniques to grow. Besides existence of higher quality 
accounting standards, the characteristics of companies and the institutional settings are 
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allowing companies to implement discretion for earnings management (Ball et al., 2000; 
Leuz, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstalher et al., 2006).  
An improvement in the quality of reported financial information provides an 
indication about the firm’s future cash flow (Liang, 2004). Again such adoption of high 
quality standards try to discourage the manipulation of earnings by making it costly and try to 
protect investors’ interests (Iatridis, 2012). However, when firms have high probability to fail 
in future, managers of these financially distress firms are under immense pressure to show 
better earnings even when there exist strict accounting standards as they will try not to be 
fired based on poor financial performance (Huson et al., 1995; 2004; Mutchler et al., 1997; 
Kothari et al., 2009). Prior studies show evidence of significant positive relationship between 
the change in probability of bankruptcy and the interaction between earnings surprises and 
distress (e.g. Howe and Houston, 2016). Shares of financially distressed firms may be 
discounted at a higher rate because distress risk is priced (Fama and French,1992; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). As firms are not sharing financial predictions with investors in debt and 
equity markets (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Massa and Rehman, 2008; Chen and Martin, 
2011) they have enough scope of earnings management to save firms’ reputation and 
personal benefit. According to the ‘comparability argument’ of the IFRS, it is less costly for 
investors to compare firms across different countries (see Armstrong et al., 2010; Covrig et 
al., 2007). Nevertheless, when the managers of financially distressed firms are using their 
discretion then the reporting incentives can change (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz, 2003; Burgstahler 
et al., 2006). Thus, it is important to test how does IFRS adoption influence the financially 
distressed firms in doing earnings management?  
High tail risk of banks is considered as the most important reason of recent financial 
crisis. Banks accessed the riskiness of the firms based on the financial report of the firms and 
the credit rating done by external agencies who mainly base their assessments on firms’ 
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reported financial statement  (Jorion et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010). Financial statements 
prepared under IFRS become more comparable across countries (Chan et al., 2013). 
However, financially distressed firms are less transparent, especially during the financial 
crisis as earnings management overcast the true and fair view of the firms. Greater reduction 
in transparency of performance of firms during the financial crisis is associated with 
increased tail risk (Jin and Myers, 2006). Moreover, during financial crisis most of the 
European listed firms have started following IFRS, so we expect that managers of financially 
distressed firms are under extra pressure to present earnings surprise for their personal 
benefit.  
In summary, we find evidence in literature about earnings management by financially 
distressed firms or changes in type of earnings management practices after IFRS or during 
financial crisis. However, there exists a gap in the literature is about types of earnings 
management practices followed by financially distressed firms after IFRS adoption and 
during financial crisis. Therefore, in particular, we examine the following question: 
What type of earnings management does managers prefer in financially distressed 







We begin with a dataset from all listed firms in the EU countries from 2000 to 2015. All 
listed firms in the EU countries are required to prepare their financial statements under IFRS 
from 2005 and onwards. We construct our dataset by merging information from Worldscope 
and the World Bank’s database. Specifically, Worldscope contains historical data from the 
publicly reported financial statements of all listed companies around the world. Finally, the 
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World Bank database is used for the macroeconomic variables. After cleaning the data for 
missing information, our final dataset includes 1,688 listed firms in the 26 countries of the 
European Union from 2000 to 2015 that constructs 26,945 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 
3.2.1 Measurement of Real Earnings Management 
 
According to the literature, there are three proxies of real earnings management for the 
related level of activities (Dechow et al., 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The first measure is the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operations (REM-CFO), the second is the abnormal levels of costs of production (REM-Prod) 
and the third is the abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (REM-Disx). In order to be 
consistent with the prior studies (Dechow et al., 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), each proxy’s parameters of regression analysis is estimated 
for the calculation of normal levels of discretionary expenses, cash flows from operations and 
production costs. Furthermore, Roychowdhury’s (2006) method is followed, which states that 
the residuals represent the abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, production costs and 
cash flow from operations (i.e. the difference between the actual and the predicted normal 
levels). 
 
The linear relationship between change in sales and sales expresses the normal levels of cash 













+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (1) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 are the total assets of company i at the end of period t-1;  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is the net 
receipts of cash that the company i received in period t; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are the net sales of 
company i in t period and ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between net sales from period t-1 to t 
of each company i.  
 
The difference between the actual level of CFO and the normal level of CFO is the 
abnormal cash flow from operations. This is the predicted value (i.e. the residual) from 
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equation (1). The abnormal cash flow from operation is represented by the variable 
REM_CFO. It is a common strategy that managers provide more lenient credit terms and 
price discounts in order to increase sales. This expansion is temporarily and increases 
earnings of the underlying period, while it disappears when prices return to their pre-discount 
old level. Moreover, the firm ends with lower levels of cash flow in the current period. It is 
suggested that lower negative estimated residuals address more sales manipulation indicating 
low levels of operating cash flows in order to manage the earnings reported upward.  Hence, 
the lower the value of abnormal cash flows, the higher the level of real earnings management. 
 
Another action can be taken by managers to manipulate real activities earnings. 
Increased production allows management team to report lower cost of goods sold. The 
production cost (PROD) is defined as the sum of the changes in inventory during the period 











+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (2) 
 
Similarly, with the next model the inventory growth is estimated. It is the regression of the 
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+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (4) 
 
 
The residual from equation (4) represents the abnormal production cost. In other words, it is 
the difference between the normal level of production costs and the actual production costs. 
REM_PROD is defined as the variable for abnormal production cost. It is common that the 
management team supports overproduction so that fixed overheads are distributed among 
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increased units and eventually the fixed cost per unit is reduced. Consequently, up to the 
point that the reduced fixed cost per unit is outweighed by the increase of marginal cost per 
unit, the total cost per unit will continue decreasing. The overproduction is presented in 
equation (4) with positive residuals (high levels of REM_PROD variable). Due to the 
overproduction of goods, the production cost of the period rises and at the same time the cash 
flow from operations decreases. These high levels of abnormal production costs 
(REM_PROD) indicate manipulation of real activity (i.e. more real earnings management). 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) analyzes the third proxy for real earnings management which 
is called abnormal level of discretionary expenses. To start with, the normal level of 













+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                 (5) 
 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents the discretionary expenses of company i in period t. The 
discretionary expenses are calculated as the sum of research and development expenses 
(R&D) and SG&A expenses (SG&A expenses related to selling, general and administrative 
expenses). SG&A expenses that are not directly related to the production and advertising 
expenses are also included. On the other hand, research and development expenses are linked 
with all costs from development of new products and processes, applications or techniques. 
 
Similarly, with the other two proxies, the residual estimated from equation (5), represents the 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses. The variable REM_DISX is defined as the 
abnormal discretionary expenses. Firms can report higher current earnings by reducing the 
discretionary expenses; the concern here is that they increase the current cash flow at the 
expense of future cash flows. Finally, the lower the value of abnormal discretionary expenses 
(REM_DISX) the higher the level of real earnings management. All or some of the real 
earnings management techniques that are mentioned above can be used by the firm’s 
management team. 
 
High level of production costs, and/or low levels of abnormal discretionary expenses 
and cash flows from operations are indications that companies engage high levels of real 
earnings management given the amount of sales. These three measures of real earnings 
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management are combined to calculate some broad metrics concerning the manipulation of 
real activities in a firm.  
 
 
3.2.2 Measurement of Accrual Based Earnings Management 
 
Following recent studies, the level of accrual-based earnings management activities can be 
estimated with two proxies of discretionary accruals. As academics and practitioners consider 
earnings management an important issue in order to study managerial behavior, the first 
proxy is the estimation of discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 2008). It is argued that this model is found to have “the 
most power in detecting earnings management” (Dechow et al., 1995). Bartov et al. (2001) 
and Guay et al. (1996) further support that the modified Jones modes is proved to be reliable 
in the identification of earnings management. The model is estimated for each company i and 













+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                               (6) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total assets of company i at the end of period t-1, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡is the 
change in sales from year t-1 to year t per company i, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the net value of property, plant 
and equipment. Finally, TAi,t indicates the total accruals of company i for the fiscal year t. 
Total accruals can be computed as the difference between the earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (EBXI) and the operation cash flows from operations 
(CFO). In order to compute total accruals, the balance sheet approach is followed using the 
formula as below: 
 
TAi,t = (Δ𝐶𝐴𝑡− Δ𝐶𝐿𝑡− Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + Δ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡–𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡)/ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1                                 (7) 
 
Where Δ𝐶𝐴𝑡 is the movement in current assets from year t-1 to year t, Δ𝐶𝐿𝑡  is the change in 
current liabilities for the same time period, Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 is the movement in cash and cash 
equivalents, Δ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 is the change in debt included in current liabilities, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡 represents the 
depreciation and amortization expense. 
 
 12 
In order to estimate the normal accruals of the company (𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡), the estimated coefficients 
from the equation (6) are used in the following equation as follows: 
 









                   (8) 
 
Where ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 indicates the movement in accounts receivable from year t to year t-1 of 
company i. The discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡, are calculated with the following equation (9). 






− 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡                                                              (9) 
The second measure to capture the managerial behavior and accrual-based earnings 
management is discretionary current accruals, which is developed in accordance with Kothari 
et al. (2005), Chaney et al. (2011) and Ashbaugh et al (2003). The performance adjusted 
measure of discretionary current accruals indicated as REDCA is used. With this method, the 
performance of the firm is controlled with ROA. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is calculated as the net earnings 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Furthermore, current accruals divided by 
total assets of the company is calculated as the sum of total accruals (TA) from equation (7) 
and depreciation and amortization expense divided by total assets. The next step is the 
estimation of the following equation (10) in order to end up with the expected current 













+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                       
(10) 
 
Finally, current discretionary accruals are estimated with the usage of equation (11): 
 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡=𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡                                                            (11) 
 
Where ECAPC represents the expected performance-adjusted total current accruals of each 
company i in period t and TCA the total current accruals of each company i in period t. ROA 
controls the performance effect on the discretionary accruals (Chaney et al., 2011). Earnings 
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that are reported in the financial statements can be increased through the flexibility of 
earnings management provided from accounting items. It should be underlined that for the 
two measures of accrual based earnings management, the absolute difference between the 
total current accruals and the expected performance-adjusted total current accruals is 
calculated. Also, the absolute difference is calculated between the total accruals and the 
normal accruals. 
 
3.2.3 Measurement of financially distress variable 
 
Following Mutchler et al (1997), we construct our main independent variable called 
probability to bankruptcy. This variable is a proxy for financially distressed firms. Franz et al 
(2014) use credit rating data to create a proxy for financially distressed firms of the USA. 
However, in our case the credit ratings are neither available for all the sample firms nor 
consistent over the years. Therefore, to construct the probability to bankruptcy (proxy for 
financial distress), we first identify firms as distressed and non-distressed if one of the 
following criteria is satisfied: (1) negative working capital in the last financial year before 
bankruptcy, (2) a loss from operations, or (3) if the firm has 3 consecutive years of negative 
ROA (the following year is coded as 1). In this procedure, we find 43% firms are stressed. 
We create a dummy variable (distress) equals to 1 if a firm is stressed and 0 otherwise. In the 
second stage, we estimate the probability of bankruptcy by a logit regression considering 
‘distress’ as dependent variable. The independent variables are current assets/total assets, 
current assets/ current liabilities, cash/total assets, current assets/sales, long-term debt/total 
assets and firm size (measured as log of the number of employees). All these independent 
variables are included with a one-year lag. In order to test the time (before and after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU member countries in 2005), a year dummy variable is 
introduced, indicated as IFRS. IFRS is equal to one in case the loan is initiated during or after 
2005. We also create a dummy variable indicating the financial crisis. We define it as 1 if 
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year is 2008-2010 (to include both financial crisis started in the USA and European debt 
crisis), and 0 otherwise. 
 
We use a number of control variables at firm’s level in our models. Following recent 
researches, the firm-specific variables included as control variables are the market to book 
ratio, the natural log of return on equity and leverage (Chaney et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 
2008; Zang, 2012). Market to book is calculated as the ratio of market capitalization to the 
common shareholders’ investment in the firm and leverage is the long-term debt divided by 
total assets. We also include firm size and net sales.  
 
We follow studies related to earning management by Faccio (2006, 2010) and 
included inflation and gross domestic product per capita as country-level control variables. 
These variables are collected from World Bank’s database. The logarithm of a country's 
average percentage of change in consumer prices per country represents the variable inflation 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Furthermore, Chaney et al. (2011) state that inflation represents a measure 
about the business cycle of a company and the variations in its economic activities. On the 
other hand, a country’s economic growth and development is indicated by gross domestic 
product per capita (GDP/CAP). GDP/CAP variable is computed as the natural logarithm of 
the changes in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (CAP) in order to be in line with 
Chaney et al. (2011). 
 
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
 
In order to examine the above-mentioned research question the following model is used in 
this study  
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𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎2𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +
𝑎3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
′ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀                   (12) 
 
The dependent variable is performance adjusted accrual earnings management and real 




In this section, we report our findings. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the chapter. The mean, median standard deviation and the upper quartile 
value are consistent with the existing studies related to earnings management and financially 
distressed firms (Braam et al., 2015).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In Table 2 we summarize the total number of firms in each of the sample countries 
considered in our study. In this table, we find that there are significantly more firms in 
France, Germany and Italy compared to other countries. Thus, to check the unbiasedness of 
the sample, we re-run the estimation on a sample without these countries, and the findings are 
similar to the full sample.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 represents the correlation between main variables explained in the previous section. 
When the correlations between earnings management are negative, it indicates that managers 
are using accrual and real earnings management measures as a substitute of each other. 
Managers also prefer to use a combination of different real earnings management measures if 
required which is consistent with the exiting literature (Cohen et al., 2008). 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
We examine the earnings management behavior of financially distressed firms and report the 
findings in Table 4. We find that, in general, financially distressed firms prefer to do more 
accrual earnings management compared to real earnings management. As financially distress 
firms are more highlighted by media and are always treated strictly by auditors, we believe 
that it is very difficult for the managers of these firms to do any type of earnings 
management. Therefore, we find statistically significant but small co-efficient of accrual 
earnings management (0.005). Nevertheless, large firms do more real earnings management 
than accrual-based earnings management.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In Table 5, when we consider the earnings management behavior by financially distress firms 
during the financial crisis, we find managers are doing significantly less accrual (-0.004) and 
more real earnings management. Negative Disx (-0.076), CFO (-0.019) and positive Prod 
(0.035) indicate that during the financial crisis managers of European financially distressed 
firms try to report earnings shock and to do that they manipulate earnings throughout the 
year. Waiting until the end of financial year to manipulate earnings to meet earnings 
benchmark, mainly during a financial crisis may not be sufficient for financially distressed 
firms.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The impact of IFRS adoption on managers’ preferences for earnings management is 
reported in Table 6. We find that integrated accounting reporting failed to stop managers 
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from doing real earnings management. Statistically significant and negative REM Disx (-
0.163), REM CFO (-0.006) and positive REM Prod (0.060) support our argument that strict 
accounting standards forced managers of financially distressed firms to adopt measures to 
manipulate earnings in short run ignoring the long-term performance of the firms. Real 
earnings management helps managers to report higher earnings, which they do without being 
caught by auditors. The inflated earnings shows an earnings shock for financially distressed 
firms and managers are able to maintain personal benefits even during financial crisis and 
under IFRS environment.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
We use a number of robustness checks by changing the specification of our variables and 
sample. Following prior literature, such as Cohen and Zarowin  (2010) and Zang (2012), we 
construct few proxies for earnings management. The first proxy, REM_PROXY1, is 
computed by multiplying the abnormal level of discretionary expenses (REM Disx) with 
negative one and then adding the abnormal levels of production costs (REM Prod). The 
higher the values on this measure, the more possible it is for the firm to manipulate 
production costs and discretionary expenses by reducing them. Following Cohen et al. 
(2010), we computed our second proxy, REM_PROXY2, by multiplying discretionary 
expenses (REM Disx) by negative one and then adding the abnormal level of cash flows from 
operations (RM CFO). For this proxy, if the value is high, this is probably an indicator that 
the firm is manipulating sales and discretionary expenses by decreasing them. We compute 
our third proxy, REM_PROXY3, (following Cohen et al. 2008), as the sum abnormal levels 
of discretionary expenses (REM Disx) and cash flows from operations (REM CFO) 
multiplied by negative one and the abnormal level of production costs (REM Prod). The 
higher the level of manipulation in real activities within the firm, the higher is the value of 
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this proxy. With these proxies, we estimate our models and find that our main results remain 
qualitatively same (the results are not reported).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU countries on 
earnings management strategies of managers of financially distressed firms. When we 
consider all firms in our sample, there is a tendency of doing accrual earnings management as 
the firms are more concerned with their reputation and long-term performance. However, the 
result is different for financially distress firms. The managers of financially distressed firms 
are always under pressure from stakeholders of the firms. Consistent with existing literature, 
we find that during financial crisis, managers of distressed firms prefer real earnings 
management. In addition, we also find that after adoption of IFRS and especially during 
financial crisis, the EU firms do more real earnings management than the period before IFRS 
adoption. The findings from our study also indicate that strict accounting standards fail to 
mitigate earnings management, particularly for financially distressed firms. Managers try to 
maintain their personal benefit and to show short-term better performance they depend more 
on real earnings management by ignoring the long-term performance of the firms.  
The study fills the gap in the academic literature related to earnings management after 
IFRS adoption and during the financial crisis by financially distressed firms. Our study can 
benefit policy makers and accounting professionals particularly in financial institutions to 
assess their credit risk while dealing with firms during the financial crisis. Future study may 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimations 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Median P75 
Accrual Earnings Management 26945 0.191 24.824 0.019 0.042 
REM (Disx) 26945 -0.472 47.457 -0.028 0 
REM (Prod) 26945 -0.04 8.635 0.089 0.142 
REM (CFO) 26945 0.014 1.14 0.001 0.056 
Distress (Logit regression) 14308 -0.052 0.72 -0.027 0.325 
S&P Credit Rating (Dummy) 26945 0.001 0.03 0 0 
Firm Size 21162 8.152 2.039 8.192 9.498 
ROE 21787 -2.391 2088.053 11.43 19.76 
Market-to-Book 23061 3.473 76.334 1.581 2.79 
Sales (/100,000) 23087 58.159 210.778 8.23 30.713 
Leverage 23054 0.292 8.353 0.134 0.251 
Inflation 26944 2.32 2.918 2.01 2.81 
GDP/Cap 25245 1.307 2.884 1.53 2.82 
Variables for logit model 
     Cash/ Total assets 22321 0.081 0.133 0.079 0.124 
Current assets/Sales 22399 6.648 332.464 0.465 0.678 
Current assets/ Current Liabilities 22529 2.53 28.992 1.342 1.876 
Current assets/ Total assets 22532 0.459 0.225 0.45 0.619 
Notes: The sample includes 1,688 listed firms in the 26 countries of the European Union from 2000 to 2015, 





















Table 2: Number of firms in each country 
 
Country Number of Firm Percentage 
AUSTRIA 33 1.95 
BELGIUM 62 3.67 
BULGARIA 39 2.31 
CROATIA 38 2.25 
CYPRUS 40 2.37 
CZECH REPUBLIC 14 0.83 
DENMARK 39 2.31 
ESTONIA 15 0.89 
FINLAND 45 2.67 
FRANCE 203 12.03 
GERMANY 208 12.32 
GREECE 39 2.31 
HUNGARY 27 1.6 
IRELAND 26 1.54 
ITALY 108 6.4 
LITHUANIA 24 1.42 
LUXEMBOURG 12 0.71 
MALTA 15 0.89 
NETHERLANDS 85 5.04 
POLAND 36 2.13 
PORTUGAL 43 2.55 
ROMANIA 43 2.55 
SLOVENIA 33 1.95 
SPAIN 75 4.44 
SWEDEN 54 3.2 
UNITED KINGDOM 332 19.67 





















Table 3: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.Accrual Earnings Management 1.000 
            2.REM (Disx) -0.952 1.000
           3.REM (Prod) -0.953 0.999 1.000
          4.REM (CFO) 0.931 -0.990 -0.992 1.000
         5.Distress (Logit regression) 0.005 -0.010 -0.010 0.021 1.000
        6.S&P Credit Rating (Dummy) -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.015 1.000
       7.Firm Size -0.034 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.187 -0.005 1.000
      8.ROE -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.016 -0.034 -0.011 0.053 1.000
     9.Market-to-Book 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.010 -0.041 -0.003 -0.014 0.100 1.000
    10.Sales (100,000) -0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.085 -0.008 0.410 0.006 -0.008 1.000
   11.Leverage 0.012 -0.021 -0.020 0.025 0.349 0.014 0.216 0.021 0.004 0.044 1.000
  12.Inflation 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.127 0.027 -0.156 0.003 -0.023 -0.057 -0.031 1.000
 13.GDP/Cap -0.007 0.009 0.010 -0.012 -0.225 -0.003 -0.118 0.003 -0.005 -0.044 -0.077 0.245 1.000
Notes: The sample includes 1,688 listed firms in the 26 countries of the European Union from 2000 to 2015, which includes 26,945 firm-year observations. For variable 










Table 4: Earnings management by financially distress firms 
All regression models are estimated using quantile regression.  
 
𝐸𝑀 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑅𝑂𝐸)
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
EM is measured by one proxy of performance adjusted accrual earnings management measure and three 
earnings management measures involving discretionary expenses, production cost and cash flow from 
operations. By construction, negative coefficients of real earnings management measure related to discretionary 
expenses and cash flow from operations refer to increase in real earnings management. *. * and ** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test). t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 Variables Accrual Earnings     Real Earnings Management 
  (Performance-adjusted)      REM (Disx) REM (Prod) REM (CFO) 
Financial Distress 0.005*** 
 




(9.09) (-5.49) (23.73) 
S&P Credit Rating (Dummy) 0.006 
 




(0.09) (0.55) (-0.12) 
Firm Size -0.001*** 
 




(1.60) (5.35) (-8.75) 
Log (ROE) 0.000 
 




(-13.60) (-15.94) (19.50) 
Market to Book 0.000*** 
 




(-15.34) (-1.90) (1.96) 
Sales 0.000 
 




(-1.33) (17.90) (0.59) 
Leverage -0.000 
 




(-0.17) (9.09) (-11.90) 
Log (Inflation) -0.002** 
 




(-5.22) (-4.24) (6.10) 
Log (GDP per Cap) -0.003*** 
 




(8.03) (5.08) (4.77) 
Country effect Yes  
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  




(-5.72) (3.35) (3.15) 
Pseudo R2 0.019 
 
0.013 0.038 0.059 
Observations 11,197 
 
11,197 11,197 11,197 

















Table 5: Earnings management by financially distressed firms during financial crisis 
All regression models are estimated using quantile regression.  
 
𝐸𝑀 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛾4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛾5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑅𝑂𝐸) + 𝛾7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛾8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛾10𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛾11𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢 
 
EM is measured by one proxy of performance adjusted accrual earnings management measure and three 
earnings management measures involving discretionary expenses, production cost and cash flow from 
operations. By construction, negative coefficients of real earnings management measure related to discretionary 
expenses and cash flow from operations refer to increase in real earnings management. *. * and ** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test). t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 Variables Accrual Earnings     Real Earnings Management 
  (Performance-adjusted)      REM (Disx) REM (Prod) REM (CFO) 
Financial Distress 0.005*** 
 




(11.60) (-8.25) (28.77) 
Financial Crisis -0.002*** 
 




(10.28) (-0.06) (5.64) 
Distress x Crisis -0.004*** 
 




(-2.79) (3.66) (-3.02) 
S&P Credit Rating (Dummy) 0.006 
 




(0.23) (0.53) (-2.41) 
Firm Size -0.001*** 
 




(0.76) (5.33) (-9.67) 
Log (ROE) 0.000 
 




(-13.34) (-25.27) (19.21) 
Market to Book 0.000*** 
 




(-1.23) (-1.94) (2.14) 
Sales 0.000 
 




(-1.01) (16.46) (0.67) 
Leverage -0.000 
 




(-0.01) (11.94) (-12.43) 
Log (Inflation) -0.001** 
 




(-6.38) (-6.17) (4.95) 
Log (GDP per Cap) -0.003*** 
 




(8.77) (5.87) (5.37) 
Country effect Yes  
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  




(-5.56) (3.55) (3.35) 
Pseudo R2 0.020 
 
0.015 0.039 0.062 
Observations 11,197 
 
11,197 11,197 11,197 













Table 6: Impact of adoption of IFRS on earnings management  
All regression models are estimated using quantile regression.  
 
𝐸𝑀 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼3𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆
∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠+𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑅𝑂𝐸)
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼10𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ 𝛼11𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜖 
 
EM is measured by one proxy of performance adjusted accrual earnings management measure and three 
earnings management measures involving discretionary expenses, production cost and cash flow from 
operations. By construction, negative coefficients of real earnings management measure related to discretionary 
expenses and cash flow from operations refer to increase in real earnings management. +. * and ** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test). t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 Variables Accrual Earnings     Real Earnings Management 
  (Performance-adjusted)     REM (Disx) REM (Prod) REM (CFO) 
Financial Distress 0.015*** 
 




(-1.29) (-8.82) (21.17) 
IFRS Dummy 0.003*** 
 




(1.21) (-12.12) (4.07) 
IFRS x Distress -0.013*** 
 




(-10.93) (7.00) (-2.07) 
Financial crisis -0.003*** 
 




(10.27) (5.45) (5.01) 
S&P Credit Rating (Dummy) 0.001 
 




(-0.92) (-0.11) (-0.21) 
Firm Size -0.001*** 
 




(2.10) (5.32) (-10.33) 
Log (ROE) 0.000 
 




(-15.58) (-15.86) (22.48) 
Market to Book 0.000*** 
 




(-1.56) (-1.67) (2.28) 
Sales 0.000 
 




(-1.80) (17.98) (-0.38) 
Leverage 0.000 
 




(0.53) (9.74) (-14.06) 
Log (Inflation) -0.001* 
 




(-6.89) (-3.80) (4.76) 
Log (GDP per Cap) -0.003*** 
 




(9.13) (4.49) (5.43) 
Country Effect 0.003* 
 




(-0.98) (5.93) (-0.39) 




(-7.00) (5.56) (2.86) 
Pseudo R2 0.025 
 
0.016 0.043 0.062 
Observations 11,197 
 
11,197 11,197 11,197 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
